The background of Gilani’s case lies with the National Reconciliation Order (NRO). The NRO issued by Pakistan’s former president, Pervez Musharraf, with the tacit support of the United States and Britain, on October 5, 2007 was designed to facilitate the return of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to Pakistan by granting amnesty to politicians, party members and bureaucrats of various wrongdoings (over 6000 individuals befitted from the Order). At the time, the hope was that with the return of Bhutto and Sharif, Pakistan would become more stable as well as appear more democratic, which would help in the US-led global war on terror. More specifically, the NRO was to assist Benazir Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf develop some sort of an alliance that would ensure stable government in Pakistan and give Musharraf, who was serving as president, more credibility; there was growing unease with the way that he assumed power – a military coup.[6] The situation however changed on December 16, 2009 when a 17-member bench of the Supreme Court struck down the Order, finding it unconstitutional on the grounds that it was not in the benefit of the national interest.[7] The decision nullified the amnesty that President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani enjoyed under the Order and by doing so, it began the process that led to Gilani’s conviction for contempt as he refused to instruct prosecutors to write to Swiss authorities to reopen their investigation into money laundering and corruption against Asif Zardari,[8] arguing that President Zardari had was protected by his office from such investigations.

This Supreme Court led by Iftikhar Chaudhry who as Chief Justice has taken an activist approach as a means to end many injustices in Pakistan and promote the rule of law in the country, in which powerful actors can often ignore the law or are able to escape prosecution because of their positions.[9] Chaudry highlighted his agenda in a speech at the Harvard Law School in December 2008, where he declared, “It’s time for Pakistan to transform from a ‘Rule of Man to a ‘Rule of Law’ state.”[10] Consequently, since he was returned to his position following the Lawyers Protest, the Court has taken on many issues and cases that have dealt with the military, the ISI,[11] and special interest groups, issuing rulings regulating the price of fuel, sugar, transsexual rights, zoning and planning laws and so on. The Supreme Court argues that by doing so, it advances the rule of law, encourages greater transparency, accountability and honesty. Opponents of the Court however, reject the Chaudhry activism. They argue that the Supreme Court is acting illegally by expanding its remit beyond what it is supposed to do. Irfan Qadir the newly appointed Attorney General for example, has claimed that not only is the court’s order in respect to Gilani’s contempt conviction void ab initio (to be treated as invalid from the outset) but rather a political decision. Other individuals have taken the position that the Court is seeking to supplement the Parliament, which affects the democratic process. In the words of Muneer A. Malik, a former President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, “The judges are not elected representatives of the people and they are arrogating power to themselves as if they are the only sanctimonious institution in the country. All dictators fall prey to this psyche – that only we are clean, and capable of doing the right thing.”[12]

Ultimately, Gilani’s conviction highlights how chaotic the Pakistani political system has become, especially since 2008. The country heads from one crisis to another, with the consequence that governance suffers, as the various branches of government – Executive, Legislative, Judiciary and the Military – are finding it difficult to work with one another. This also means that smaller actors have come to enjoy more power and influence, as seen for example in January 2011, when the Muttahida Qaumi Movement withdrew from the PPP-led coalition claiming that it could no longer support the PPP government due to its mismanagement of the economy. Najam Sethi however argued at the time that the MQM were “trying to negotiate to extract maximum concessions and are playing to the national sentiment… These are just political tactics, and if there was a move to bring down the government, then there would have been better coordination between opposition parties.”[13] More recently, tensions between the PPP and the PML-N has helped such a group as Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, Pakistan Movement for Justice) [14] or the Difa-e-Pakistan Council, (DPC, Defense of Pakistan Council), not to mention the public role of the Jama`at-ud-Da`wa (JuD, Organization for Preaching).[15]

Fundamentally, a true democratic society needs the rule of law, as elections are not a true measure of democracy,[16] which is why the Supreme Court won the respect and adulation of many, but at the same time an increasingly activist Court whose rulings are either symbolic or are ignored undermines the campaign towards strengthening Pakistan’s stride for democracy. The various actors within the Pakistani political system would be wise to remember that none of the major politicians is untainted, as all have been accused of malfeasances and have served time in prisons.[17]

Since 2008, when a civilian government replaced the military government[18] as the various leaders shifted their alliances or formed new ones,[19] Pakistan has plunged further into the abyss, which has meant that democracy has been damaged, social and economic stability undermined and a loss of faith in civilian governance has also occurred. Pakistan’s various branches must come together and realize that only by working together can Pakistan grow and develop, which in turn would help change international perceptions about Pakistan and enhance international security and possibly even end the foreign presence in South Asia.

There are good reasons to highlight this event.  First, progress made on nuclear security since the early 1990’s has received little public attention.  This is largely because of the lackluster and technical nature of day in/day out, routine work at nuclear-associated sites throughout the world.  Nonetheless, nuclear weapons represent the most significant defense and strategic challenge facing the U.S., our allies, and the broader global community.

The summit also drew attention to another aspect of nuclear security that had previously received scant notice.  That is, it is more likely that we will have a nuclear explosion or radiological incident in the next several years, not through a terrorist/rouge state nexus, but rather an incident stemming from lack of resources, inattention, a technical misstep, or simple ineptitude.  Such an incident is not difficult to envision considering the sheer volume of nuclear weapons and associated material worldwide.  In spite of some success over the past twenty years, there are still more than twenty thousand nuclear warheads in various categories around the world.[1]

The second nuclear security issue that the summit highlighted is the challenge posed by “benign proliferation.”  This refers to the broader base of nuclear-associated material and technology which is available worldwide:

“In the past, nonproliferation has often been viewed from the perspective of haves and have-nots, nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapon states, states with advanced nuclear fuel cycles and those without, developed and developing countries.  Today the boundaries are blurred.  The clandestine diffusion of centrifuge design and manufacturing data demonstrates that suppliers in low or middle-income countries can supply sophisticated nuclear products.  An advanced nuclear fuel cycle is not needed.  Indeed, no fuel cycle at all is necessary for a state to become part of the nuclear proliferations problem.”[2]

It was good to see both of these challenges highlighted, and for the leaders to commit to the next Nuclear Security Summit, which will be hosted by the Netherlands.

Finally, the summit also highlighted simmering regional issues in East Asia.  While there was a tacit agreement among the heads of state to not criticize North Korea at the summit, only one leader strayed from the script: Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda.  This was no surprise for close followers of Asian political dynamics, as Tokyo is steadily moving to reassert itself on regional matters.  The content of the strong remarks by Noda also reflected a good opportunity to send a simultaneous three-way message.  That is, (1) to Pyongyang: we’re really starting to lose our patience regards missile overflight and nuclear weapons, (2) to Beijing: you need to do better job of reining in North Korea, and (3) to Seoul: we’re grateful for your hospitality and appreciate your frustrations with the North, but we are Japan, and when it comes to northeast Asia, we’re going to be vocal.  Noda also may have felt a need to continue Japan’s post-earthquake/tsunami tendency to make sure that their interests are not discounted.

We should all be hopeful that additional, steady progress is made between now and the next summit, and that the focus at the summit on an issue of truly strategic importance will not diminish.  As President Obama stated at the meeting, “we have the opportunity, as partners, to ensure that our progress is not a fleeting moment, but part of a serious and sustained effort.”

In 897 AD in what was called “the Cadaver Synod”, Pope Formosus was tried for various violations of Church laws. He was found guilty, his edicts were annulled, his robes were taken from him, and three fingers on his right hand were severed, before the former Pope was thrown in the Tiber River. Bizarrely, Pope Formosus had died of natural causes several months earlier. They prosecuted a dead man. Fast forward over a thousand years to 2012. Russia is about to put on trial a dead man, Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer, who died in prison from the effects of his imprisonment and torture by the Russian Government in November 2009.

Magnitsky’s death has caused universal condemnation by world leaders, international organizations, such as the European Union, as well as human rights groups. His crime was exposing a massive tax fraud scheme by the Russian government and officials within the Medvedev/Putin regime in the amount of over $230 million dollars. Not content to leave Magnitsky in peace, the Russian government has hounded his family and harassed his mother, Natalia Magnitskaya. They are even going to bring charges in absentia against Magnitsky’s former employer, William Browder, a British citizen, of the Hermitage Capital Fund.

The Magnitsky case is indicative of Russian justice in the 21st Century. Joseph Stalin did not prosecute the dead, yet the current government plans to move forward with the prosecution unless Magnitsky’s family ceases its efforts to seek justice for their family member, Sergei. “Even in Stalin’s time, the authorities did not prosecute people who were dead. The Interior Ministry is so desperate to justify its repression of Sergei Magnitsky that government officials are running roughshod over all legal precedent, practice and morality,” said an Hermitage Capital spokesperson.

Boris Kibis, the very investigator who found in 2010 no credibility to the Russian President’s Human Rights Council report that Magnitsky had been tortured and mistreated in violation of the European Human Rights Convention, is now completing the investigation against the long dead Magnitsky and intends to refer the case for prosecution this year. What those charges are remains to be seen.

It is important to note that the United States Senate has taken up the cause of the torture death of Sergei Magnitsky to sanction the officials who were responsible for his death. Led by Senators John McCain and Ben Cardin with 28 co-sponsors, the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act (S. 1039) is being considered this congressional term.

Sir Tony Brenton, United Kingdom Ambassador to Russia, 2004-2008, declared on the one year anniversary of the death of Sergei Magnitsky, November 2010: “The death of Sergei Magnitsky is an appalling indictment of some parts of the Russian judicial system. It is important for Russia, as it is for the wider world, that they clean this poison out.”

Prosecuting dead people has only happened a few other times in history. Such dead defendants included Joan of Arc, Thomas Beckett, John Wycliff, and Martin Borman. The Catholic Church banned the practice centuries ago. In modern jurisprudence prosecution of the dead is unheard of, particularly by civilized nations who respect the rule of law. We simply do not try the dead. This Russian example of justice brings shame to the rule of law and discredit upon its judicial system.

Secretary Panetta’s decision to raise the matter on U.S. national television may appear on the surface as somewhat surprising especially as U.S.-Pakistan relations are at a nadir – a product of the OBL operation – though in all probability before raising the matter the issue was discussed with CIA Director David Patreaus, Secretary of State Clinton and other high-level officials in the Administration.

Undoubtedly, what motivated Secretary Panetta, who was director of the CIA at the time of the OBL operation, is concern over the health and safety of Dr Afridi, as reports indicate that he has been subjected to torture and is facing the possibility of being tried for treason.[2] By raising the matter in such a public forum Secretary Panetta could be indicating to Pakistan that it wants an end to Dr Afridi’s detention.

As commendable as Secretary Panetta’s concerns are for Dr Afridi, this latest chastisement by a senior American official of Pakistan is unlikely to help smooth relations between these two countries. Pakistan, which is in the midst of a major scandal (memogate) is likely to view Secretary Panetta’s comments as typifying American hubris and disconcertedness in respect to what is currently taking place in Pakistan. By rejecting claims that Dr Afridi possibly committed treason, the U.S. fails to accept that at the end of the day, the operation called for U.S. military forces to unilaterally enter Pakistan and conduct a military operation in a city located 30 miles from the capital. One cannot help but wonder how Washington would react if President Caldron was to send Mexican Special Forces to hunt down drug barons operating in Arizona or New Mexico or how Washington would react to U.S. nationals working surreptitiously with Mexican authorities to bring down drug barons located in the United States? The remarks also indicate a level of American lack of care that Pakistan is still grappling not only with the OBL operation but the December 2011 incident in which 24 Pakistani soldiers died, for which President Obama has issued no apology (the apology came from other government officials). There is an increasing sense that the U.S. feels that it can violate Pakistani sovereignty to achieve its own national security goals – defeating Al Qaeda – which to Pakistanis often comes at their expense.[3]

Putting aside rising anti-Americanism on the Pakistani street, what Washington ignores is that the OBL strike severely embarrassed the military and the ISI and even though there is no evidence of these entities colluding in OBL’s presence in Abbottabad, U.S. policymakers keep making such allegations.[4] By raising Dr Afridi’s case in public, Secretary Panetta has helped to reassert the ISI and military’s embarrassment resulting from the May operation. It will also probably encourage the ISI and the military to act harshly against Dr Afridi, using him as an example to anyone that may wish to assist the U.S. in locating Al Qaeda operatives without Pakistan’s knowledge.[5] A more effective way to secure Dr Afridi’s release would have been through quite diplomacy, something that U.S. policymakers seem unable to do when they deal with Pakistan.[6]

Trying to understand U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan is becoming increasingly difficult, as it flies in the face of logic and appears designed to exacerbate tensions through accusations and recriminations that often lack substance or evidence. At a time when Pakistan is in the midst of a power struggle between the military and the civilian government and there is growing anti-Americanism on the Pakistani street caused by repeated U.S. violations of Pakistani sovereignty, one must wonder why the Administration would add more tinder to the fire.

Pakistan’s civilian-military relations are highly complex as they have many facets and elements,[7] which is why the aim here is limited to highlighting possible reasons as to why Generals Kayani and Pasha are so determined to resist the government.[8] Put simply, if Pakistan is ever to become a viable democracy, a stable relationship between the army and the government is essential as only when the civilian polity truly controls, directs and manages the military, a solid base for democracy can emerge.[9] Thus, to fully understand the tensions heightened by memogate, it is important to recognize that it is intimately linked to the challenges faced by General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s Army Chief, and Lieutenant-General (ret.) Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the ISI.[10] The two face significant and complimentary challenges that begin with recognizing that both institutions are in desperate need of reform and that incessant interventions in civilian matters are undermining Pakistan’s standing in the world. However, the two must contend with tremendous internal opposition to the substantive reforms necessary, coupled with a history of mistrust vis-à-vis civilian politicians.

Over the last few years, made worse by the Raymond Davis incident and the bin Laden operation, the army has come to feel that its position in Pakistan society is threatened as the total support that it once received from ordinary Pakistanis and the United States is no longer guaranteed. This shift is, at least to the mind of the army, a product of foreign action that has led to the army’s honor and capabilities to be publicly challenged.[11]

A first issue that General Kayani has to address is the nature, structure and fabric of the army, which as an institution has failed to change its perception and nature. The main challenge comes from junior and middle-ranking officers whose views of Pakistan’s security concerns are largely anachronistic.[12] These individuals are seething over the bin Laden killing in May 2011 and the NATO incident that left 24 soldiers dead.[13] Junior officers express doubts and concerns if not clear rejection of Pakistan’s close relations with the United States, whom they feel malign them with claims of collusion with terrorists while not appreciating Pakistan’s sacrifice in the ‘war on terror.’ Thus, over the past few months, General Kayani has worked hard to address the anger of the junior officers, as well as that of the senior military officers. To that end, he has visited garrisons across the country and spoke to officers.[14] Kayani knows that even though the army is generally well disciplined, there is nothing to suggest that it is immune from the prospects of a junior officer-led coup, as history has shown that junior officers are able to overthrow governments.[15] Director-General Pasha faces a tougher challenge to that of Kayani in dealing with his subordinates. This is because the ISI follows an institutional framework designed to address Pakistan’s inherent insecurities, as since the late 1950s, the institution has been able to operate without any real restrictions, first because no other agency challenged its position, but also because various leaders encouraged it to grow and develop.[16] The ISI is an exceptionally intricate organization, well versed in the art of subversions and suspicion, a legacy of the war against the Soviets, which radically altered the ISI, encouraging Islamic conservatism within the organization and embedding a strong Pakistani-Islamic outlook that has grown with the passage of time.[17] Michael Hayden, the former CIA director claims that Pasha has become more suspicious of U.S. motives vis-à-vis Pakistan,[18] leading the ISI to focus more on reasserting its position as the preeminent intelligence unit in Pakistan while making it clear that the CIA cannot and will not operate independently in Pakistan.[19] This position resonates with the rank and file of the institution.

A second challenge is breaking relations with entities and actors that the army and the ISI have helped create. For decades, both organizations nurtured domestic and foreign entities that conduct subversive operations on the behalf or the behest of the army and the ISI under the guise of seeking to promote the interests of Pakistan. Thus, subversive groups emerged in Pakistani cities (many are engaged in sectarian violence), helping to foster sectarian tensions, and in such areas as Kashmir and along some of Pakistan’s borders.[20] These ties have become difficult to break as unofficial lines of communication and support have been establish, which means that even if and when orders are given to cease operation with these entities, it will remain difficult to ensure that the orders are obeyed.

Kayani and Pasha’s third challenge is contending with an increasingly angry Pakistani public, one that feels disillusioned at its own political system, whom it identifies as corrupt, decadent and supine in that it seeks to appease foreign interests as oppose to Pakistani ones. Between 2007 and 2009, the military establishment went through a difficult period, as public support was on the wane due to some of the policies of Pervez Musharraf. This may explain why the army and the ISI both kept a low profile in the February 2008 elections.[21] For the next 18 months, anger continued, as the military was unable to deal with the rising levels of domestic terrorism. The army’s engagement with the militants, whether in the way it conducted its military operations or the way it sought to impose its will, caused as much damage and harm to civilians.[22] Thus, the army being a pragmatic institution altered its approach and accepted a truce with the Taliban and Islamic militants.[23] However, the Taliban push, their brutal slaying of soldiers, police-officers and civilians coupled with the 2010 horrific floods have helped the army restore its tarnished reputation as it did a better job than the civilian leaders (President Zardari opted to continue with his trip in Europe).[24]

A fourth challenge faced by Kayani and Pasha is rising support to non-establishment groups and parties, as Pakistanis embrace regional parties and new actors. These actors adhere to a jingoistic, nationalist and anti-American agenda whereby the traditional parties and the government come under criticism for following the American line, supporting U.S. presence in Afghanistan and not addressing the rising levels of corruption and economic hardship that is paralyzing Pakistan. A good example of this potential shift is the rise of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which has been around since the mid-1990s. The PTI was never considered a serious political party, as although many respect Imran Khan due to his extraordinary cricketing career and philanthropic work he was mainly identified as a playboy. However, the PTI has spent the last decade engaged in social welfare programs, while Khan adopted a consistent, nationalist anti-American stance (opposition to U.S. presence in Afghanistan, negotiations with the Taliban and greater accountability, transparency and openness within the political system[25]). He has also positioned himself against the government and the PPP especially President Zardari,[26] winning Khan tremendous support, (in a rally in Lahore in December 2011, Khan drew between 70,000 to possibly 200,000 people[27]). Nothing seems to suggest that interest in the PTI is waning.[28]

Kayani and Pasha’s fifth challenge is finding a way to deal with Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. This has always been a key test for the Pakistani security establishment, which has become much more difficult due to conflicting interests of Pakistan and the United States, especially over Afghanistan. Kayani knows that U.S. policymakers are unhappy with the way in which the Pakistani government, the military and the security services conduct themselves. Washington’s demands begin with ending Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan; controlling the military’s interaction with domestic Islamists; and keeping the army from taking over the political system. These are simply things that take tremendous time and effort to accomplish and must be done diplomatically and quickly to ensure that Pakistani military honor is impinged.

A sixth challenge faced by Kayani and Pasha is Afghanistan. It is becoming clear that Pakistani policymakers do not know how to proceed when it comes to Afghanistan. The two share a turbulent history. Traditional military strategy holds that Pakistan needs Afghanistan for strategic depth. From Afghanistan, the Pakistani army would launch counter attacks against the Indians.[29] Increasingly, the quagmire in Afghanistan has led to new worries for Pakistan one of which is what would the Afghan non-Pashtun population do should President Karzai broker a deal with the Taliban. Pakistanis and others are concerned that following such a move the Afghan non-Pashtun population may decide to break away from the Afghan state leaving the various Pashtun groups to fight among themselves.[30]

Generals Kayani and Pasha and whoever replaces Pasha when his term ends in March 2012, have many challenges before them as they arguably strive to introduce the concept of accountability to institutions that have never known such boundaries before. Pakistan’s weakness stems from endogenous and exogenous factors, which on the one hand demand radical reform. However, radical change is dangerous in a fragile state leading established stakeholders to oppose the change as it normally comes at their expense. Ultimately, as tensions rise and lines are being drawn, instability in Pakistan will also rise, which is often a precursor before a coup occurs. Nevertheless, the military must be aware that the worst thing that could happen to Pakistan at this stage is another military coup, which may explain why General Kayani has discounted such a thing.[31] Yet, the notion of a judicial coup remains a possibility. This would greatly harm Pakistan and add to the fragility of the state, as it an effect would mean that the Court has sided with the army, which in all probability wants to see Gilani and Zardari out of office. Pakistani leaders must come to some sort of an understanding that would allow the Gilani government to fulfill its term and enable Pakistan to hold new elections. This would be enormously important, as it would be the first time that a Pakistani civilian government completed a full term, emphasizing that Pakistan can develop a democratic tradition and that tensions between the various branches can be resolved without resorting to a coup.

The story is not in budget cuts, which everyone knew were coming. Likewise, it’s not in scaling back ground forces, Army but also Marines, or U.S. capacity to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns à la Iraq and Afghanistan, which were also expected.

Beyond these preoccupations in the media and Washington, five underlying “tension areas” are worth watching for, as details of the plan begin to take shape in budgeting processes:

*  Sea and air over land forces;
*  The fate of counterinsurgency and stability operations doctrine;
*  Army adaptive leadership;
*  Economic security; and
*  Technology over tactics

Given space constraints, I’ll address only the first two tensions today—look for follow up posts on the rest.  In any case, these tensions—many of which are unresolvable—will inform the framework for the next phase of shifting resources throughout the U.S. defense sector. But more importantly, they reveal a larger, ongoing problem: the gap in U.S. strategic thinking in the decades after 9/11—a problem that requires resolution for the U.S. to do what Obama asserts, “sustain U.S. global leadership.”

Sea and Air over Land Forces

Yes, the “drones president” will ramp up Navy and Air Force capabilities and downsize the Army—both in size and power-projection capacity.  In some respects, you can’t blame the Commander in Chief for playing his strong hand.  As Maj. Gen. Robert Scales (Ret.) recently noted: “There is absolutely no credible evidence that any enemy today is capable of or can afford to. . .wrest American dominance of the air, sea or space.” Quite the contrary, Scales adds, “our enemies have achieved success on the battlefield by adapting their tactics to minimize the effect of American air and sea power.” For an administration not known for crystal clarity on security matters, one emerging priority is air-sea power, that traditional instrument of conventional warfare now adapted for 21^st century containment—albeit crafted for irregular adversaries as much as states.

Yet Scales’s comments are also an asymmetric cautionary tale: irregular adversaries have adapted their methods (i.e., blending in with local populations) to evade these preferred instruments of national power. So while the President’s choice is no surprise, it may spell multiple problems for both accurate threat assessment and for adaptive operations. Most obviously, the assumption that ground wars are a thing of the past while air and naval conflicts (think Iran and China) will be the biggest future U.S. security challenges is risky—especially as a matter of policy and given emerging ‘hot spots’ in regions that have drawn troops in the past (Mideast, Africa). While forthright security analysts concede that prediction never was a science, insofar as threat assessment remains big business with ripple effects across a vast set of government agencies, defense contractors, and millions of personnel—with impacts for national and international security—careful thought about the basis for these assessments is sorely needed.

But the real problem lies in the operational dangers in positioning sea-air to solve complex problems on the ground. Aside from the political blow-back and imprecision of air/drone attacks, the reality is that after 9/11, the armed forces, spearheaded by Army efforts, achieved what amounts to a second revolution in military affairs. The hardest-won lesson from manpower-intensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was the key role of nonmilitary, nonkinetic, support-oriented interventions for reducing conflict and stabilizing troubled states.  Often equated with counterinsurgency doctrine or COIN, military leaders became in many cases the strongest advocates for non-military and “whole of government” approaches to complex conflicts, including population-centric strategies, reduced firepower, and strengthening governance institutions and civil society sectors. A second, related insight was the importance of local immersion—a “boots on the ground” vantage point—for succeeding in politically complex environments, whether insurgencies, failed states, or mass atrocity situations.  It’s highly unlikely, for instance, that local security forces can be trained, native legal institutions reformed, or population’s needs addressed from the air or from a carrier ship. Last, in today’s complex global conflict landscape, flexible, cross-trained, joint forces must handle multiple conflict types at once, including COIN, but also conventional ground warfare, sub-surface, cyber, and special operations, as well as strategic communication campaigns.

New Air-Sea Battle paradigms will do no better—and may do far worse—without integrating these hard-won lessons into practice, a feat that will require careful synthesis of Army operational experiences and ‘out of the box’ thinking.

The Fate of COIN Doctrine and Stability Operations

But the bigger problem is at the strategic level. On the one hand, the key architects (Petraeus, McChrystal, Odierno, H. R. McMaster, Dempsey, among others) of this impressive paradigm shift in warfighting helped to elevate stability or peace operations to the same strategic priority level as combat operations—a defense policy revolution if there ever were one—so that the world’s greatest military decided as a matter of policy to make peace building as important as warfighting. This historic shift, often reduced to COIN doctrine, begot additional insights: that conflicts can only be reduced, national and global security ensured, using all the instruments of national power and by building local capacity.  It also meant that the weighty decision of going to war itself, of using armed conflict as an instrument of foreign policy, now required a military obligation to contemplate and plan for peace.

On the other hand, the overemphasis on COIN doctrine itself began to substitute for these broader insights and for a missing ‘grand’ strategy, as Hew Strachan and others have pointed out.  This was true for both Bush and Obama, and it meant a trap for generals like McChrystal who had little strategic guidance within which to nest his tactical successes. Afghanistan and Iraq become icons of counter-insurgency “strategy,” even while COIN operations are “a means to an end, not an end in themselves” designed to explain “the use of armed force for the purposes of the war, not “the purpose of the war itself,” and finally to address how, not why are we fighting, as Strachan stresses. As a guest at Tom Rick’s Foreign Policy blog put it, COIN was never anything more than one “method of conflict” among others, with “its own doctrine, tactics and strategy,” to be applied when needed—not to be understood as “an organizational ‘design tool’ to build the U.S. armed forces around.” This growing rift in the military and defense policy communities over COIN has meant, as Strachan notes, that “subliminally, the operational level of war was moving into the space created by the absence of strategy.”  Such a convergence is fraught with many dangers—notably, operationally winning battles but losing wars—not to mention the dereliction of duty on the part of policymakers to position the U.S. in the world.

Insofar as these significant strategic gaps remain, the new defense guidelines will not clarify or strengthen the U.S. role—no matter how much we shift theater, geography, conflict typology, or weapons delivery system.

Instead, they may distract from the problem of a missing strategy in favor of new fixations—all while leaving aside existing promising avenues for developing a U.S. foreign policy role learned from post 9/11 stability operations and reconstruction efforts.  These advances include the unprecedented cooperation across government agencies (Defense, State, Justice, USAID), coalitions of nations and their militaries, local partnerships, and “joint” participation by all military service branches required in 21^st warfare. The power of this last element of military “jointness,” integrating capacities and working across organizational cultures, is exemplified in the night raid against Bin Laden in May 2011 (involving Navy, Army, Joint Special Operations, while authorized under C.I.A. legal authorities). Since nonconventional wars now make up the vast majority of the world’s conflicts and since the Army, Marines, and Special Forces have done the lion’s share of fighting irregular wars, their experiences should be leveraged and integrated with support from air and sea power, thus continuing “joint” initiatives for different applications.

While large military footprints, nation-building efforts, and the costs that go with them must be reduced, we should not be too quick to abandon the hard-won lessons of the post-9/11 era, including the wealth of strategies to strengthen nonmilitary interventions and collaborations for mitigating instability and reducing international conflict. U.S. force commitments in the future, including humanitarian operations like Libya, with both stability and reconstruction elements, must be based on the foundation of these lessons—not reinventing the wheel with reduced resources and manpower to do so.  Abandoning these lessons would also mean backtracking on the significant domestic investment made in revolutionizing U.S. military training and education and the tremendous leadership talent forged in the process.

A recent policy recommendation by retired Army LTG David Barno, Dr. Andrew Exum, and Matthew Irvine at the Center for New American Security calls for a more accelerated change of mission to ‘security force assistance’ (SFA) to begin pushing the ANSF to the fore as its country’s lead security provider.  The current approach features NATO forces leading COIN operations as the main effort supported by the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A), responsible for rapidly growing and fielding the ANSF to partner with, and eventually replace, NATO units in the field.  As the authors of this brief suggest, accelerating the shift to SFA, with a greater number of Afghan units in the field supported by embedded advisors, certainly assumes a greater risk to Afghanistan’s security in the short run.  Yet, providing Afghan units greater opportunities to learn and gain valuable field experience now with the bulk of NATO resources still in country – as opposed to a rapid security handover in the final months before the 2014 transition – will increase the likelihood that the ANSF will hold on to their hard fought security gains and allow some space for institution building and economic development beyond 2014.  It now appears the mission is headed in this direction with the announcement of four U.S. Army brigades to deploy as Security Force Assistance Teams.

Security force assistance is the next logical step in the triage of armed statebuilding in Afghanistan.  But the ‘train and equip’ model of security assistance runs against the grain of long term SSR goals.  SSR involves the cultural and structural transformation – and construction where absent – of a state’s core security actors into effective, professional, and accountable agents under civilian control.  Training security forces (e.g., SFA) is a core element of SSR, but doing it without an equal emphasis on developing civilian capacity and control and oversight mechanisms in the ministries of defense and interior and in the judicial system may be dangerous.  It may, in fact, militarize the security sector to the point of entrenching an imbalance in civil-military relations that would make the challenges of fighting corruption and preventing human rights abuses, or worse, coup attempts all the more difficult.

NTM-A has made significant progress in building the size and capabilities of the ANSF since its inception in 2009, increasing the Afghan National Army and Police by roughly 75,000 and 40,000, respectively.  Likewise, NTM-A is on track to meet its November 2012 ANSF end strength target of 352,000 as well.  For now it remains unclear, however, how NATO’s efforts to date, focused mainly on the uniformed services, will influence broader institutional reform across the Afghan security sector.

First, the Afghan National Police are currently trained and employed – mostly by U.S. military personnel – to fill a COIN role in local communities, serving essentially as paramilitary forces focused on citizen protection and holding territory cleared by NATO and Afghan Army units.  But as Robert Perito of the U.S. Institute of Peace indicates in a recent interview, to be sustainable the Afghan police still needs significant training to provide regular civilian police functions, such as crime prevention, emergency management, and traffic regulation, critical functions for demonstrating the legitimacy of the Afghan state.  Additionally, more must be done to bring the Afghan Local Police (ALP) – a community based initiative started in 2010 to increase security by paying armed locals to protect themselves – into the fold under the supervision of the Afghan government and NTM-A.  While the ALP has proven valuable in COIN efforts against the Taliban, a recent Human Right Watch report recommends improved mechanisms to vet, train and monitor the ALP following reports of abusive and criminal behavior.

Second, civilian expertise within the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior is sorely lacking.  The reality that both ministries are predominantly led and staffed by current and former Afghan Army generals is a major long-term obstacle.  Although this reflects a general shortfall of qualified civilian experts to fill key defense and interior positions, it flies in the face of tangible civilian oversight.  The new Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program is making some headway, with one recent civilian advisor indicating that his Afghan counterparts are now discussing “how to educate and recruit future Afghan civil servants to join the Ministry of Defense” as a means of improving civilian control of the ANSF.  It is difficult to tell, however, whether such talk will translate into a greater civilian role in driving Afghan defense and internal security policy.

Achieving anything close to the ideal vision of security sector reform in Afghanistan before 2014, much less in the next decade, is unrealistic. ‘Good enough’ is now the operative threshold to be met.  But efforts made today will shape the future development of the ANSF and have consequences for both Afghan security and politics well beyond the 2014 transition.  As expert Mark Sedra notes in a recent book chapter on Afghanistan, “experience has shown that short-termist approaches to SSR, rather than nurturing democratically accountable and rights respecting security institutions, can breed security force impunity, corruption and politicization” (p. 235).  Accordingly, regardless of how fast or slow the overarching mission in Afghanistan shifts away from COIN and toward security force assistance in the coming months and years, NATO should look to reprioritize its training and advising emphasis on the Afghan police and developing Afghan civilian capacity at the ministerial level to correct for existing imbalances and to set the Afghan security sector and its civil-military relations on a more sustainable path.

Q. Why has the use of drones increased so much under the Obama Administration? Is that a strategic change – what is behind that?

It is a strategic change. I think the Administration realized that because of the relative precision of the weapon, the relatively low risk to U.S. personnel when they are used, and the relatively low cost of using the weapon, that  they could achieve more as a counterterrorism strategy using this one rather than what we call ‘boots on the ground’ – lots of personnel. So strategically I think drone use is up as a counterterrorism tool. To the extent that it angers the communities in which they are used, I think we pay a dear price. So at some point if we are successful in countering terrorism and we are focusing instead on building communities or counter insurgency I think you’ll see the drone use decline. That’s my hope anyway.

Q. Why is that your hope?

Because I think it does cause a great deal of anger and antipathy at the United States out of fear that this technology might be unleashed in their own direction.

(Prof. Banks comments:)

Under international law, the real controversy occurs when a drone is used outside of what we think of as a traditional battlefield. If a drone is fired in Yemen, a drone is fired in Somalia or a drone is fired in some other part of the Middle East or Asia, where there is not an act of war going on, the argument in international law is that the only way to use force in those environments is through the police to enforce the law, arrest them. Our view (the view of the United States government) is that the war against al-Qaeda is a global war. They don’t pay attention to geographic or state boundaries and we can’t either as we go after them. So if they are setting up a base in Yemen or Somalia, we have to find them there and take the war to them there. It is a controversial position.

Q. Other countries are using drones, how do you see this evolving?

It’s a worrisome aspect. As the technology evolves, it’s ‘off the shelf’, anyone can build a drone. Anyone with enough talent. They are not terribly expensive. The technologies that have been classified they find their way our into the open environment or they can be copied and replicated. So we could have a drones arms race, and that would be I think a very dangerous thing. Not only because the government themselves would perhaps find new ways to fight with each other, but non-government actors could acquire these things, criminal organizations, drug runners, those who wish to extort and make demands in the private sector, it could be a form of corporate warfare which a government could lose control of.

Q. Is there a way to avoid that?

I think the way to avoid that is to arrive at a set of international agreements about the use of these technologies – try to impose a system of import and export controls, licensing, monitoring in the international community, so that to the extent that these technologies are available their use is regulated.

Full show can be viewed here: http://g1.globo.com/videos/globo-news/sem-fronteiras/t/todos-os-videos/v/uso-de-avioes-sem-piloto-em-missoes-militares-se-espalha-pelo-mundo/1716514/

This latest development comes after months of speculation over a controversial memo passed by an American-Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz to former American military chief Admiral Mike Mullen on May 10, 2011. The memo, which surfaced soon after the killing of Osama bin Laden, reportedly came from President Zardari via the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States at the time, Hussain Haqqani. In the memo President Zardari offered that in return for U.S. assistance he would rein in the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and eliminate Section S – the body charged with maintaining relations with the Taliban, the Haqqani network and others. Zardari also offered to establish a new Pakistani national security team[5] that supposedly would be more pliable to Washington’s demands.

The reason why the memo and the killings have caused such anger within Pakistan is that ordinary Pakistanis are trying to come to terms with the way the world sees their country (a hotbed of Islamic radicalism and terrorism, without recognizing the damage caused by terrorism to Pakistan – 40,000 dead and billions lost in revenue). Pakistanis increasingly claim that radicalism and terrorism has come to their country courtesy of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. The view on the street appears to be that the U.S., NATO and the Afghan government are the ones not dealing with terrorists, while the Pakistani army battles away. Lieutenant General Asif Yasin Malik, commander of the 11^th Corps who is supervising the Pakistani military effort in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has declared, “We will take action against the terrorists in our area and Nato and Afghanistan should also take action against them (terrorists) in their area across the border… The Afghan government and Nato should not allow terrorists’ safe havens in Afghan provinces along the Pakistan border.”[6]

Second, over the past six months, Pakistan has had its sovereignty repeatedly violated, mainly by the United States, which has sent military forces into Pakistan to conduct operations. To a nation perpetually in fear of attack, this is a major concern, especially as U.S.-India relations are on the rise. Pakistanis are aware that after the T-90S debacle India is increasingly looking for new suppliers,[7] making them fearful of close U.S.-India relations.

Third, Pakistanis are frustrated with their own civilian leaders, whom they feel do not represent their interests and that of Pakistan. President Zardari’s corrupt background has remained with him, explaining his low popularity rating. The debate over the 2007 National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) has only heightened such perceptions as the country remains in turmoil following the Supreme Court ruling that declared the NRO unconstitutional. These issues have allowed the military, which over the last years has come under criticism as Pakistanis came to see its meddling in politics and especially in sponsoring of radical groups as a threat to their peace and security, to reassert itself in Pakistani society. This cannot help the development of sustainable democracy in Pakistan.

The death of 24 regular Pakistani troops who according to Pakistani sources were over a mile into Pakistani territory has allowed the army to claim again that Pakistan needs the army more than ever, as the country comes under more and more threats. Pakistanis remember the way their civilian leaders capitulated over the Raymond Davis incident and the killing of Osama bin Laden, and Pakistanis are tired of these violations, especially among the rank-and-file who view these violations as a stain on their honor. Thus, as the army’s stock rises on the Pakistani street, politicians and public leaders’ emphasize that violations of Pakistani sovereignty will no longer be tolerated. This has major implications for the U.S. and the region, as we are likely to see a more aggressive Pakistani foreign policy that will only further frustrate Washington. That is, Pakistani leaders – civilians and military – will now need to bang the jingoistic, nationalist drum even louder than before.

All hope must rest on the enigmatic General Kayani, the Pakistani army chief, who now must devise a way to continue to work with the United States, the bête noire for his middle-ranking officers, who last year at the National Defense University challenged their commander as to why they are engaged in a war in the tribal belt.[8] It is imperative that the United States take drastic measures to change AfPak, as it is clearly not working. Afghans appear increasingly frustrated with U.S. presence that many nowadays see as occupation or supporters of a corrupt government and system.[9] Pakistanis are also expressing anger with the United States whom they feel fails to appreciate their sacrifices in dealing with terrorism and insecurity. Washington must understand that U.S. national security should not lie solely on having physical military presence in South Asia. This is because whenever military mistakes occur, it not only destroys months and years of great hard work undertaken by the indefatigable U.S. military whose commitment to bring a better tomorrow for South Asia has been commendable, but instead fosters anti-Americanism. Such mistakes coupled with unguarded statements by U.S. leaders in respect to the region ultimately undermine U.S. national security.

There have been several concrete steps from this flurry of activity.  Among them are the APEC proposed Pacific Rim Free Trade Zone, and the emergence of newer, more active players in the 21-member body (e.g. Vietnam, Chile and Canada, to name a few).  This is in addition to traditional efforts exerted by Japan, China, Russia, and others, not in the least because the APEC nations represent all the strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, and account for more than half of the global gross domestic product.

In addition to economic initiatives, the President announced this week that more than 2,000 U.S. Marines will conduct training and exercises from facilities in northern Australia, providing ready access to the South China Sea.  In doing so, the President stated that “as we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and missions in the Asia-Pacific a top priority.”  This initiative has more importance because of the strategic significance of the Philippines, where the U.S. closed down substantial basing facilities (Clark, Subic Bay and Cubi Point) in the 1990’s.  To underscore the importance of the Western Pacific, Obama’s schedule was complemented by the Secretary Clinton’s visit to the Philippines, where she conducted a noteworthy event aboard USS Fitzgerald in Manila Bay.

Many have interpreted this recent activity in the Asia-Pacific region as more about evolving issues between the U.S. and China as anything else.  However, this interpretation is wrong for two reasons.  First, leaders in the U.S. and Asian nations have made it clear that closer security ties with Beijing are a goal – or in the words of the President, “we’ve seen that China can be a partner, from reducing tensions on the Koran peninsula, to preventing proliferation.”   The Administration has also made it clear that “we’ll seek more opportunities for co-operation with Beijing, including greater communication between our militaries, to promote understanding and avoid miscalculation.”  Secondly, while the U.S.-China relationship is important, it has always really been about the regional context.  In particular, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Russia, India, the Philippines, Vietnam and others constitute a significant regional center of gravity, and effective diplomatic and security efforts between and among all of them (and the U.S. and Canada) represents the soundest footing  for trans-Pacific engagement, and long-term regional security.